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City of Chicago v. Wilson and Constitutional
Protection for Personal Appearance: Cross-
Dressing as an Element of Sexual Identity
By LAURA RICHARDS CRAFT*
MATTHEW A. HODEL**
Introduction
Dress and hairstyles are traditional avenues of self-expression. As
such, they are representations of the individuality that a nation com-
mitted to the principle of diversity must, at least in theory, foster. Jus-
tice Marshall recognized that personal appearance "reflects, sustains
and nourishes"1 individuality and therefore is more than just a matter
of fashion. Toleration of eccentric or culturally shocking dress styles is
consistent with these values; however, it is equally apparent that there
may be a recognized state interest in controlling appearance if there is a
danger posed to society. A clash between freedom and security in this
context involves more than the danger that an individual will be de-
prived of a chosen dress or hair style. The existence of an appearance
regulation in nearly any context may facilitate discriminatory or arbi-
trary enforcement or may simply be an excuse to keep persons with
unconventional or "offensive" life styles out of the public view. The
method for resolving these conflicting interests is in serious dispute.
Recently the Illinois Supreme Court confronted this issue in Cty of
Chicago v. Wilson.2 In Wilson the court examined the constitutionality
of a local ordinance prohibiting any individual from appearing in pub-
lic clothed as a member of the opposite sex with intent to conceal his or
her gender. Two male transsexuals, who were required to wear wo-
men's clothing and adopt a feminine life style as part of psychiatric
* B.A., 1977, University of California at Los Angeles. Member, Second Year Class.
** B.A., 1977, California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo. Member,
Second Year Class.
1. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 250 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. No. 49229 (IlI. May 1978). At the time of this Note's printing, official publication
of the Wilson opinion was still awaiting the filing of a dissenting opinion from Chief Justice
Ward, and Justices Underwood and Ryan.
[1151]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
therapy in preparation for sex-reassignment operations, were arrested
under this provision. They asserted as a defense that the ordinance was
unconstitutional since it deprived them of the right to exercise control
over their personal appearance. The Wilson court found the ordinance
invalid only as it applied to the particular defendants. Its decision was
based upon the recognition that the defendants' interest in exercising
choices over their appearance was an ingredient of the personal liberty
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and
upon the city's failure to show that cross-dressing, when done as part of
preoperative therapy, was likely to result in criminal acts or harm to
public morals.
3
Wilson is an important addition to a confused and controversial
area of constitutional law: protection of choices in personal appear-
ance. Formerly, this struggle had been primarily restricted to public
employees, military personnel, prison inmates and students challenging
grooming regulations.4 Wilson adds to the fray private citizens, specifi-
cally transsexuals, who exercise personal appearance choices contrary
to statutory restrictions. Approximately ten thousand Americans are
transsexuals,5 and the existence of statutes in at least ten states6 that
could be used to prohibit cross-dressing assures this group, and others
who engage in similar conduct, such as transvestites, or persons who
dress in "drag," a place in the present controversy.
This Note examines Wilson and its contribution to the appearance
question. Part One treats the decisional law prior to the United States
Supreme Court decision in Kelley v. Johnson.7 It describes the confu-
sion and lack of consensus the issue engendered in the lower courts,
with particular emphasis on the Seventh Circuit. Part Two analyzes
Kelley, the major Supreme Court decision involving personal appear-
ance rights. This second section will discuss the standard announced
by the Court, the limitations of the decision and the attempts by the
lower courts to apply the Kelley test. Part Three explains the history
and rationale of the Wilson decision. The authors analyze the standard
of review utilized by the Illinois Supreme Court and discuss the ration-
ale underlying its holding. Part Four concludes that Wilson represents
a definite affirmation of the individual's right to control personal ap-
3. City of Chicago v. Wilson, No. 49229, slip. op. at 3-4 (Ill. May 1978).
4. Comment, Long Hair and the Law. .4 Look at Constitutional and Title VII Chal-
lenges to Public and Private Regulation of Male Grooming, 24 KAN. L. REV. 143, 143 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Long Hair and the Law].
5. Clark, The Transsexuals, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22, 1976, at 104.
6. These states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Texas, Utah, and Washington. ERICKSON EDUCATION FOUNDATION, LEGAL ASPECTS
OF TRANSSEXUALISM 7 (1973), cited in Comment, M. T v. J T: An Enlightened Perspective on
Transsexualism, 6 CAP. L. REV. 403, 411 n.44 (1977).
7. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
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pearance and is a significant step towards a more adequate standard of
review. It is suggested, however, that the court failed to sufficiently
explain its reasoning and delineate the scope of its holding. Therefore,
it is anticipated that the controversy over constitutional protection for
personal appearance choices will continue to demand significant judi-
cial attention.
State of the Law Before Kelley
A Legacy of Confusion
During the 1960's, long hair and unconventional dress became rec-
ognized symbols of protest. They represented not only specific political
objections, but the stylistic independence of the wearer: an unwilling-
ness to be blindly classed with the rest of society. Schools, public em-
ployers, and various institutions often responded with vigorous
enforcement of dress code regulations, which naturally generated a se-
ries of constitutional challenges. Appearance-based litigation became
common; well over one hundred hair-length cases were decided in fed-
eral courts between 1969 and 1975.8 The disposition of these cases was
often confused and resulted not in consensus but in fragmentation.
Cases concerning the right to control personal appearance before Kelley
v. Johnson9 were divided in their approaches to virtually every signifi-
cant issue,'0 most importantly: 1) the constitutional source of protection
for freedom of appearance; 2) the extent of the protectable interest; and
3) the appropriate standard to apply in determining the constitutional-
ity of an infringement of this interest.
Source of Constitutional Protection
To some extent, the degree of constitutional protection afforded
freedom of appearance depends upon the specific source of that interest
in the United States Constitution. The courts have recognized a wide
variety of possible sources. Some courts have characterized dress as
expressive conduct and therefore have found the source of protection in
the first amendment; however, in the overwhelming majority of cases,
this rationale has been unavailing."
8. Long Hair and the Law, supra note 4, at 143. For a collection of the hair length
cases, see 84 HARv. L. Rav. 1702 (1971).
9. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
10. See Hutter, Kelley v. Johnson and Tonsorial Tastes: The Death Knell of Substantive
Due Process?, 41 ALB. L. Rnv. 411,440-46 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Kelley v. Johnson and
Tonsorial Tastes]; Long Hair and the Law, supra note 4; Comment, Public Schools, Long
Hair, and the Constitution, 55 IowA L. REv. 707 (1970).
11. E.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 614-15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989
(1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 260
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1971); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445
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The Supreme Court addressed the question of appearance as ex-
pressive conduct for the first time in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,12 a case involving school children who
wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. The Court de-
scribed a spectrum with "pure speech" at one end and unexpressive
conduct at the other and found that because the symbolic quality of a
black armband was akin to speech, it was protected by the first amend-
ment. Tinker was in some respects an easy case for the Court to decide
since the communicative nature of the armband was commonly under-
stood. The Court, however, established no specific guidelines for deter-
mining what constitutes expressive conduct, and it avoided the question
of borderline behavior when it refused to hear numerous hair-length
cases in which the plaintiffs had claimed first amendment protection.
13
There is a general consensus that Tinker would be inapplicable to per-
sons dressing solely for their own pleasure with no intention of commu-
nicating a particular idea,14 but beyond this, first amendment
protection for personal appearance is an undecided issue.
Since the right to make one's own appearance choices without gov-
ernment interference is not specified anywhere in the United States
Constitution, plaintiffs have commonly looked to the fourteenth
amendment due process clause for protection. The fourteenth amend-
ment specifically provides that no one shall be deprived of liberty with-
out due process of law, and the argument has been repeatedly made
that freedom of appearance is part of this "liberty."1 5 Several lines of
case law give content to the word liberty and establish at least a few of
the interests that it protects. One such line of cases establishes a right to
privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment, and some courts have
protected freedom of appearance on the theory that it is part of this
F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972); Gfell v. Richardson, 441 F.2d
444, 447 (6th Cir. 1971); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (1st Cir. 1970); Jackson
v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). The rejection of
the free-speech rationale in appearance cases is discussed in Long Hair and the Law, supra
note 4, at 145-46.
12. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
13. Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 47 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974); Karr
v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); Freeman v. Flake, 448
F.2d 258 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1971); Olff v. East Side Union High School
Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972); Stevenson v. Board of
Education, 426 F.2d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424
F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
14. 393 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1969). The Court in Tinker strictly limited its holding by
stating, "The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regulation of the length of
skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or deportment. . . .Our problem involves direct,
primary First Amendment rights akin to 'pure speech' ". Id.
15. Kelley v. Johnson and Tonsorial Tastes, supra note 10, at 440; Long Hair and the




The right to privacy recognized by the Supreme Court in Griswold
v. Connecticut'7 and Roe v. Wade18 is perhaps more clearly expressed
as a right to personal autonomy. Griswold struck down a Connecticut
statute that prohibited the use of contraceptive devices by married and
unmarried persons alike. The Court reasoned that a married couple's
choice about birth control is part of the fundamental right to privacy,
which the state cannot invade without a showing of overriding need. 19
Roe expanded the termprivacy to include a woman's right to terminate
her pregnancy. Although both cases concerned choices in the control
of one's body, they dealt with matters normally not exposed to public
scrutiny. Herein lies one distinction between the traditional privacy
cases and the appearance cases dealt with in this Note. As the First
Circuit expressed it, most courts20 do not "see the logic of expanding
the right of marital privacy identified in Griswold v. Connecticut...
into a right to go public as one pleases."'
' z
A second rationale commonly advanced and occasionally accepted
is based on the ninth amendment. Until Justice Goldberg's concurring
opinion in Griswold,22 the ninth amendment had been largely dis-
counted as stating a truism also expressed by the tenth amendment.
23
Justice Goldberg reasoned that the ninth amendment gives the four-
teenth content, indicating that the due process clause should be read to
16. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970);
Axtell v. La Penna, 398 F, Supp. 1077, 1080 (W.D. Penn. 1971); Black v. Cothren, 316 F.
Supp. 468, 470 (D. Neb. 1970); Crossen v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 114, 117-18 (D. Conn. 1970).
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Although Griswold recognized a right of privacy, the Justices
disagreed about the source of that right. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found the
privacy right in the penumbras of the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. Id at 482-
84. Justice Goldberg argued that the ninth amendment signifies a broad range of personal
rights to be protected by the fourteenth, id at 486-87, while Justice Harlan argued that the
right was a basic part of the due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment and
applied the Palko test, stating that privacy is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," id
at 500. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). For an understanding of the
right to privacy in terms of personal autonomy, see Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the
Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten
Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); id at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
20. E.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 614 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989
(1972); Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 261 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1971);
King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1042 (1972); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (Ist Cir. 1970); Jackson v.
Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir.), cer. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
21. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (Ist Cir. 1970).
22. 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
23. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 518-19 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); id at
529-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Redich, Are There "Certain Rights. . .Retained by the Peo-
ple" ,37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787, 802-10 (1962).
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cover a broad range of personal freedoms "retained by the people. '24
In the years following Griswold, Justice Goldberg's reasoning has not
achieved wide acceptance, but a number of scholars continue to urge
that the ninth amendment be used to protect personal rights unspeci-
fied in the Constitution, but emanating from a "natural law."' 25 Several
courts found this reasoning persuasive and have applied it to the right
to control one's personal appearance.
26
Third, although the privacy right has been termed fundamental
and is thus entitled to the highest degree of judicial scrutiny, the four-
teenth amendment also encompasses lesser rights commonly referred to
as liberty interests. 27 Although a liberty interest enjoys some constitu-
tional protection, it may usually be infringed by the state with only a
very minimal showing of justification. A variety of standards of review
have been applied in such cases, as will be discussed later, but for now
it is important to note that many courts have recognized a hierarchy
within the category of liberty interests and have accorded greater pro-
tection to some than to others.28 The hierarchy is generally based on
the court's assessment of the importance of the interest, but there is no
accepted system to use in making such determinations and the result
has been increased inconsistency among the lower courts. There is no
way of clearly defining what constitutes a liberty interest, but large
numbers of courts have included the right to control personal appear-
ance within this category. 29 This view has gained wide acceptance
since the Supreme Court decision in Kelley.
30
Fourth, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
has also frequently been invoked in appearance cases, but with varying
degrees of success. The approaches taken have differed greatly; some
plaintiffs claimed that the regulations as applied resulted in racial or
24. 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
25. See B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 4 (1955); Redich, Are
There "Certain Rights... Retained by the People'?, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787 (1962).
26. E.g., Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
See text accompanying notes 50-52 infra.
- 27. But cf. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972)
(holding that only fundamental rights requiring strict scrutiny are encompassed within the
substantive aspect of the fourteenth amendment and that there is no category of lesser lib-
erty interests).
28. See notes 56-57 & accompanying text infra.
29. Compare Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971) and Richards v. Thurston,
424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970) with Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 614-15 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972) and Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist. 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.
1968).
30. E.g., East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), rev'don
rehearing en banc, 562 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1977); Syrek v. Pennsylvania Air Nat'l Guard, 537
F.2d 66, 67 (3d Cir. 1976); City of Chicago v. Wilson, No. 49229, slip. op. at 3 (Ill. May
1978).
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sexual discrimination, 31 while others contended that arbitrary and in-
consistent enforcement within the affected class had denied them equal
protection.32 In the early case of Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,33 a prison rule
requiring inmates to wear short hair was found to deny equal protec-
tion to a Chinese inmate who was forced to cut off his traditional
queue. More recently, Crews v. Clones held that a school hair-length
regulation discriminated on its face against male students since it was
not applied to their female classmates. 34 Other courts have been unper-
suaded by Crews and have held that as long as the rule is applied con-
sistently to males there is no denial of equal protection.35 Such courts
have refused to recognize the suspect nature of sex-based classifications
and it is likely their analysis, if not their holdings, would be altered by
recent sex discrimination cases.36 In other school hair-length cases,
plaintiffs have unsuccessfully claimed that expulsion of offenders arbi-
trarily creates a class of long-haired males.
37
Extent of the Right
Freedom of appearance has been variously categorized as a funda-
mental right,38 an important liberty interest, 39 a liberty interest but "not
of the first magnitude,"'4 and an interest unprotected by the United
States Constitution.4' The significance of these labels is immediately
apparent since they influence the degree of constitutional protection to
be afforded, and in fact the application of a particular label is generally
outcome determinative because of the standard of review that it trig-
gers. This gives a deceptively clear picture of the constitutional review
process since the labeling of an interest as a fundamental right, a liberty
interest, or an unprotected interest is in itself a value judgment affected
by a variety of factors. Also, within the area of liberty interests, courts
31. E.g., Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970).
32. Dostert v. Berthold Public School Dist., 391 F. Supp. 876 (D. N.D. 1975); Miller v.
Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (M.D. Ill. 1969); Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970).
33. 12 Fed. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546).
34. 432 F.2d 1259, 1266 (7th Cir. 1970).
35. Eg., King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972); Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1971); Jackson v.
Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
36. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) are
notable for their increased concern about sex discrimination although still falling somewhat
short of the strict scrutiny engaged in when a suspect classification is involved.
37. E.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972);
Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968) (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
38. See notes 50-52 & accompanying text infra.
39. See notes 53-54 & accompanying text infra.
40. See notes 55-59 & accompanying text infra.
41. See note 60 & accompanying text infra.
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have applied a number of standards of review, 42 often without any ex-
planation of the differentiating factors. With these added complica-
tions in mind it is possible to engage in a general discussion of the
various labels applied to the right to control personal appearance.
A fundamental right is one that is so integral to our society as to
require heightened protection, even though it may not be specifically
enumerated in the Constitution.43 The tautological nature of this defi-
nition explains the difficulty that courts have in determining what be-
longs in the category of fundamental rights. At bottom, the
determination is based on a value judgment: a finding that the right is
one of exceptional importance in our society. In part because of this
lack of a clear standard most courts have deferred to Supreme Court
judgment in determining what constitutes a fundamental right. Free-
dom of association,44 the right to vote,45 the right to travel,46 and the
right to privacy and control in certain basic matters of marriage,47 child
bearing, 48 and child rearing49 have all been so categorized by the
United States Supreme Court.
Only one circuit went so far as to apply the fundamental-right
classification to freedom of personal appearance. The Seventh Circuit,
in its 1969 decision of Breen v. Kahl,50 applied this characterization to a
child's right to wear long hair in contravention of school grooming pol-
icies.5 ' Because the Supreme Court has limited the category of funda-
42. For a discussion of these various standards and their implications, see Kelley v.
Johnson and Tonsorial Tastes, supra note 10, at 440-46.
43. Cf NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416. "These are rights
which the Court recognizes as having a value so essential to individual liberty in our society
that they justify the justices reviewing the acts of other branches of government in a manner
quite similar to the substantive due process approach of the pre-1937 period. Little more
can be said to accurately describe the nature of a fundamental right, because fundamental
rights analysis is simply no more than the modern recognition of the natural law concepts
... " Ronald Dworkin suggests in his rights thesis that individual rights are trump cards
which outweigh utilitarian considerations. See, Richards, supra note 17, at 703.
44. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
45. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89 (1965).
46. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
47. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. Carey v. Population Serv. Int., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 315 U.S. 535 (1942).
49. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
50. 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
51. Id at 1036; accord, Olffv. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971); Karr v. Schmidt, 460
F.2d 609, 621 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972).
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mental fights very strictly in the past, Breen represented a surprising
expansion of this doctrine by a circuit court. It should be noted that
Breen was not followed by any other circuit courts, at least insofar as it
labeled appearance a fundamental right; indeed, the Seventh Circuit
itself backed off from this holding in several subsequent cases.
52
As was discussed earlier, freedom of appearance is more com-
monly classified as a liberty interest, a term derived from the due proc-
ess clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. A number of
courts have expressly applied this term to the appearance right,53 indi-
cating that it is entitled to some protection but less than that due a
fundamental right, even though both may find their source in the four-
teenth amendment. Some courts have recognized a hierarchical scale
within the liberty interest classification 54 and it is often unclear what
factors affect the valuation of a particular interest within this scale.
One important factor appears to be the context in which the right is
asserted.
The Seventh Circuit in Miller v. School District Number 16755
termed the appearance right a liberty interest but "not of the first mag-
nitude"56 and proceeded to deny it any sort of constitutional protection
in the public employment context.57 It did not, however, overrule its
earlier decision in Breen which termed the appearance rights of a
school child fundamental.58 Justice Stevens, then a circuit court judge
writing the Miller opinion, reasoned that the different contexts justified
the dramatically different characterizations of the right at stake. In so
doing, Stevens involved himself in the basic question of whether the
context affects the nature of the right or merely the standard of review
to be applied. Stevens did not directly address this question, but the
Miller decision seems to take the unpopular position that the right it-
self is affected.59 The logical conclusion of such a position is that pub-
52. See Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974). While other Sev-
enth Circuit cases did not reject the fundamental rights label, they began to incorporate
language indicative of a lesser standard of review. See Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939,
943 (7th Cir. 1972).
53. E.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971); Richards v. Thurston,
424 F.2d 1281, 1285 (lst Cir. 1970).
54. For a discussion of these hierarchical evaluations and their implications, see Kelley
v. Johnson and Tonsorial Tastes, supra note 10, at 440-46.
55. 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974).
56. Id at 665.
57. Id at 668.
58. For a discussion of how the inconsistency between Breen and Miller was resolved,
see notes 120-24 & accompanying text infra.
59. Justice Stevens reasoned that the loss of a teaching position was not as serious as a
student's expulsion from school since a new job might be found in a more liberal school
district. Stevens thus justified calling the appearance right fundamental in cases involving
students, but only a liberty interest not of the first magnitude in public employment cases.
March 1979]
lic employment could be conditioned on the surrender of
constitutionally protected rights.
As appearance litigation became more common in the late 1960's,
a number of courts went so far as to deny that personal appearance was
sufficiently important to justify any constitutional protection. 60 As will
be discussed in a later section, Kelley would seem by implication to
overrule this determination.
61
The Appropriate Standard of Review
Once a court has decided that freedom of appearance is constitu-
tionally protected, it must determine under what circumstances the
state may curtail this right. Roughly speaking, appearance cases before
Kelley applied four different standards. Some courts placed upon the
plaintiff the burden of showing that there was no conceivable, rational
relationship between the regulation or statute and a permissible state
objective. Under this test, formulated in Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co. ,62 the challenger's burden is very difficult to meet, and application
of the test amounts to a virtual assurance that the restriction will be
upheld.63 Williamson involved state regulation of dispensing opticians,
and the Court's choice of standard was prompted in large part by its
unwillingness to meddle in what it viewed as essentially legislative de-
In essence, Justice Stevens argued that the circumstances in which the case arose affected the
basic nature of the right and not merely the state's interest in curtailing that right. See note
93 infra for a further discussion of this problem.
60. E.g., Zeller v. Donegal School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1975); Karr
v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d
932 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972). These decisions seem to have been
precipitated, at least in part, by the increasingly burdensome caseload of hair-length cases
from public schools. In Zeller and Karr, the courts expressed their concern over the
proliferation of appearance cases. 517 F.2d at 697; 460 F.2d at 615-16. But as Judge Wis-
dom notes in his vigorous dissent to Karr, proliferation of cases is nothing more than one of
the "constitutionally irrelevant consequences" of protecting the appearance rights and
should not have been considered in deciding Karr. 460 F.2d at 621.
61. See notes 91-92, 110-16 & accompanying text infra.
62. 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). The case describes the rationality test as follows, "But
the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It
is enough that there is an evil at hand, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." Cf. Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213,
218 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding that there must be a "real and substantial relationship" between
the statute and its purported aims).
63. See Long Hair and the Law, supra note 4 at 149; Craven, Personhood The Right to
be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 711. The suggestion has been made that the rationality
test is too amorphous to be a useful tool in appearance cases. See Miller v. School Dist. No.
167, 495 F.2d 658, 668 (7th Cir. 1974); Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 261 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1971). Some courts, instead of requiring a rational or reasonable
relationship, have required a "real and substantial relationship." E.g., Jackson v. Dorrier,
424 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
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terminations of economic policy. The state was not even required to
articulate a purpose; the Court was willing to conceive of one on its
own.
A derivative of the Williamson test utilizes essentially the same
standard but requires the state to articulate an acceptable legislative
purpose.64 This slight shift in burden is little help to the challenger
when the court continues to require only a conceptual rather than real
connection between the regulation and its stated purpose. A few courts
have reversed the classic Williamson formulation in appearance cases,
requiring the state to show that a rational connection between the regu-
lation and an acceptable governmental purpose in fact does exist, thus
shifting some of the burden and increasing the chance that the restric-
tion may be found unconstitutional. 65 This standard of review has also
come under the rubric of the "rationality test"'66 although it bears little
resemblance to the standard announced in Williamson.
Another common test in appearance cases has involved judicial
weighing of the parties' interests. 67 The individual's interest in choice
of dress is balanced against the state's need to compel uniformity in the
circumstances affected by the regulation. One important factor in the
weighing process is the severity of infringement on the individual's
rights.68 For example, a rule requiring students to have short hair is a
64. E.g., Stradley v. Adersen, 478 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1973), a]/'g, 349 F. Supp. 1120 (D.
Neb. 1972). See Kelley v. Johnson and Tonsorial Tastes, supra note 10, at 443-45 for a discus-
sion of numerous permutations on the rationality test occurring in appearance cases.
65. E.g., Brownlee v. Bradley County Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360, 1366-68 (E.D.
Tenn. 1970); Stevenson v. Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97, 101 (S.D. Ga.
1969), aj'd, 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1970); Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 261 F. Supp.
545, 551-52 (N.D. Tex. 1966), afl'd, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968).
66. More commonly, this is formulated as a requirement for the state to show a "genu-
ine need" for the restriction. At least one commentator feels that the genuine need test
provides a much needed, workable middle level of review. Kelley v. Johnson and Tonsorial
Tastes, supra note 10, at 443. Kamerling v. O'Hagan, 512 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1975); Romano
v. Kirwan, 391 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. N.Y. 1975), vacated sub nom, Kirwan v. Romano, 425
U.S. 929 (1976); Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom, Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). These cases are good examples of the genuine need test but
their rationale has met Supreme Court rebuff. See text accompanying note 85 infra.
67. E.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971); Gfell v. Rickelman, 441
F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1971). These cases voiced the balancing test in terms of necessity but
reached very different results. In Bishop the court rejected pure opinion testimony that long
hair had deleterious effects on school performance and social adjustment and required the
defendant to show actual disruptions at the school resulting from a student's long hair. In
Gfell the defendant prevailed on a showing that some threats had been made to long-haired
students and that long hair was forbidden in sports and shop classes. Cf. Richards v. Thur-
ston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970), which finds that a type of weighing test is necessary when
an individual's interest in possession and control of his or her own person is at issue. The
Richards court strikes the balance in favor of the plaintiff, requiring the defendant to show a
strong countervailing interest once the plaintiff has established the curtailment of the liberty.
68. There is no clear line between a minor and a major infringement, but courts have
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more serious infringement than a rule requiring their teachers to wear
ties; a tie can be removed at the end of the work day whereas the stu-
dent must take his short haircut home with him. Another important
factor bearing on the state's interest is the context in which the restric-
tion operates. 69 For this reason, the state is allowed to require greater
uniformity of appearance from prison inmates and military reservists
than from school children and public employees working in a typical
office situation.
The criticism most commonly leveled at the balancing test is that
the final decision rests more upon the judge's personal values than
upon an established rule of law.70 Although the weighing test lacks a
mechanical device with which to strike a balance, it has the advantage
of bringing value judgments to the forefront where they are subject to
review and analysis. The test gives the court an opportunity to openly
discuss the factors that it considers important and, perhaps because of
this flexibility, balancing has received wide application in appearance
cases,7 1 although it has not always gone by its proper name. Weighing
is most commonly engaged in when there is a liberty interest involved
that the court finds particularly deserving of protection.
72
A different test is employed when the court has determined that a
fundamental right is involved. In such cases the court applies strict
scrutiny to the legislation and requires the state to demonstrate a com-
pelling interest in and overriding need for the restriction. 73 The regula-
tion must be drawn as narrowly as possible to avoid any unnecessary
infringement of the individual's rights. These two requirements of
course make it virtually certain that the challenger will prevail. Char-
acterization as a fundamental right would have changed the results of
made it clear that they think such a distinction is cogent. E.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d
609, 615 n.12 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972).
69. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970). See note 93 & accompanying
text infra for a discussion of context and its importance in Kelley and Wilson.
70. Kelley P. Johnson and Tonsorial Tastes, supra note 10, at 445; cf. Craven, Per-
sonhood" The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 711-14 (tracing the reluctance to
employ weighing to the speedy retreat from the judicial intervention epitomized in Lochner
v. New York).
71. For the suggestion that a weighing test should be adopted in all personal appear-
ance cases, see Kelley v. Johnson and Tonsorial Tastes, supra note 10, at 453-54; Craven,
Personhood" The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 719-20. See also Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 249 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); notes 99-106 & accompanying
text infra.
72. Courts which engage in this process are implicitly dividing liberty interests into less
and more important rights, and are according them different degrees of protection. This
distinction creates another possible area for inconsistency between various districts.
73. But see the Seventh Circuit line of cases beginning with Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d
1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970), which voiced the strict scrutiny test in
terms of substantial necessity, a term borrowed from United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968).
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many cases decided under the rationality or weighing tests.
74
Because strict scrutiny and the Williamson rationality test are out-
come determinative in most cases, courts have struggled to develop an
intermediate standard of review that will take into account more fac-
tors and will allow the court greater flexibility. When faced with a case
that cries out for a remedy, but where the fundamental right label is
probably not appropriate with its implications of strict scrutiny in sub-
sequent cases, there has been a tendency to manipulate the characteri-
zation of the right and the standard of review to reach the desired
result.75 This has left the courts in a precarious position with respect to
precedent and the Supreme Court has not resolved the difficulty by
sanctioning an intermediate form of review in appearance cases.
Confusion over the appropriate standard of review and the source
and characterization of the right in appearance cases has given rise to
massive inconsistency. In a country that prides itself on equal treat-
ment of its citizens, the right to dress as one chooses has varied from
state to state and from district to district. The Seventh Circuit is a
prime example of this confusion. It began by terming appearance a
fundamental right and applying a form of strict scrutiny.76 In decisions
subsequent to Breen, language of a rationality test began to appear,
albeit in dicta, indicating some uncertainty about the appropriate stan-
dard of review.77 Miller complicated the situation by applying one
standard to public employees while allowing the very different stan-
dard established for students to stand.78 In short there was a great need
for Supreme Court leadership in this field, but in case after case
certiorari was denied.79 Finally, the Supreme Court decided the case
of Kelley v. Johnson,80 which involved a police department's dress code
limiting hair length and forbidding beards and mustaches on its of-
ficers. When the case was heard in 1975, the question of freedom of
appearance was ripe for decision.
74. See Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803(lst Cir. 1976) (indicating that strict scrutiny
would change the result of the case but refusing to apply it).
75. Craven, Personhood" The Right to be LetA/one, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 708; LongHair
and the Law, supra note 4, at 149.
76. See note 73 & accompanying text supra.
77. See Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939, 943 (7th Cir. 1972). See also note 52 &
accompanying text supra.
78. See notes 120-24 infra.
79. See note 13 supra.
80. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
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Kelley and the Right to Control One's Appearance
Factual Background
Kelley v. Johnson8 is the first Supreme Court case to actually de-
termine the constitutionality of a governmental regulation of personal
appearance.8 2 A New York policeman asserted that a departmental
hair regulation 83 infringed his constitutional rights.84 The Second Cir-
cuit recognized the patrolman's choice in appearance as an ingredient
of general personal liberty and required the department to show a
"genuine public need" for the regulation. 85 It set aside the district
court's dismissal of the patrolman's claim and ordered it to reconsider
the case in light of this standard. On remand, the district court found
the department failed to meet this burden8 6 and sustained the patrol-
81. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
82. Prior to this time Justices Douglas, Black and Stevens had, in varying capacities,
addressed the same issue. Justice Douglas dissented from the denial of certiorari in Olff v.
East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042 (1972), denying cert. to 445 F.2d 932 (9th
Cir. 1971); Freeman v. Flake, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972), denying cert. to 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir.
1971); and New Rider v. Board of Educ., 414 U.S. 1097 (1973), denying cert. to 480 F.2d 693
(10th Cir. 1973). Typically, each dissent was strongly worded, urging the Court to settle the
issue at least in the context of a school regulation on student hair length. Douglas intimated
in 00r that a student's right to choose his own hair style should be deemed fundamental
under the ninth amendment. 404 U.S. at 704-05. Justice Black, writing as representative
Justice for the Fifth Circuit, refused to vacate a stay of injunction of a school hair-length
rule stating, "[I]t would be difficult to prove by reason, logic, or common sense that the
federal judiciary is more competent to deal with hair length than are local school authorities
" Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201, 1203 (1972), denying cert. to 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.
1972). Justice Stevens, prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, authored the major-
ity opinion in Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974), holding that there
was no constitutional deprivation when a school teacher was fired for wearing a beard and
sideburns.
83. The regulation was directed at "the style and length of the hair, sideburns, and
mustaches; beards and goatees were prohibited, except for medical reasons; and wigs con-
forming to the regulation could be worn for cosmetic reasons." 425 U.S. at 240.
84. The action sought injunctive relief on several grounds: violation of the right to
freedom of expression under the first amendment and denial of due process and equal pro-
tection under the fourteenth amendment. Dwen v. Barry, 336 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1971),
rev'd, 483 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1973). The suit was originally brought by the respondent's
predecessor, individually and as president of the Suffolk County Patrolman's Benevolent
Association. 425 U.S. at 239.
85. 483 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1973). In writing the Second Circuit opinion, Judge
Smith catalogued the various possible sources of constitutional protection for appearance.
He finally settled on a safeguard within the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
and stated, "Personal liberty is not composed simply and only of freedoms held to be funda-
mental but includes the freedom to make and act on less significant personal decisions with-
out arbitrary government interference." Id at 1130. The court also recognized that while
the status of an individual as a policeman, as opposed to a private citizen, did not effect the
existence of this right, it was relevant to the question of whether the right was outweighed by
a legitimate state interest. Id at 1130-31.
86. The Deputy Commissioner defended the regulation, contending that it protected
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man's challenge. 87 After the court of appeals affirmed the judgment,88
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
89
Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion 90 and ruled that
the patrolman's right to control appearance was not fundamental; his
interests were distinguishable from interests in "certain basic matters of
procreation, marriage and family life" which warrant the highest de-
gree of judicial scrutiny.91 Instead the court "assumed" for the pur-
poses of the decision that the patrolman's right found protection as a
less vital fourteenth amendment liberty interest.
92
In addressing the merits, the Court stressed the fact that the police-
man brought the action not as a private citizen but as a public em-
ployee.93 Public entities are traditionally entitled to great judicial
deference in the making of organizational choices which affect their
employees. By analogizing to a number of recent cases sustaining
otherwise impermissible restrictions on federal and state employee first
amendment activities,94 the Court was able to conclude: "There is
the safety of the officers and promoted esprit de corps within the department. Kelley v.
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 242 (1976).
87. Dwen v. Barry, No. 74-1900 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1974), afd without comment, 508
F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'dsub nom. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
88. 508 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1975).
89. 421 U.S. 987 (1975).
90. Justice Powell concurred; Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented;
Justice Stevens took no part in the decision. 425 U.S. at 238-39.
91. The opinion explicitly distinguished the present controversy from earlier Supreme
Court cases in which a fundamental right to privacy had been established. See notes 46-48
& accompanying text supra.
92. 425 U.S. at 244. The Court admitted that its prior decisions offered little precedent
on the question of whether there is a liberty interest, protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment, in matters of personal appearance. Id
93. Implied in the Court's reliance on Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968),
is the theory that the circumstances surrounding a claim (such as an employee-employer
relationship) do not alter the individual's constitutional rights, but instead affect the stan-
dard of review a court will use when considering an infringement of those rights. Pickering
held that a person accepting employment as a school teacher did not give up constitutional
rights he would otherwise enjoy as a public citizen; however, since the state did have a
significantly different interest in regulating the free speech of its employees than it did in
regulating similar activities by the public in general, the problem was one of balancing the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, against the state interest in promoting efficient public
service. Id at 568. Contra, Kelley v. Johnson and Tnsorial Tastes, supra note 10, at 419
(suggesting that the Supreme Court reasoning in Kelley alters the right and not just the
standard of review); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 254 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (ex-
pressing the same fear of limitation of rights rather than shift of standard). The decision,
however, textually does not bear out this inference. Justice Rehnquist, in addition to analo-
gizing to Pickering, simply criticized the court of appeals for making the distinction between
right and standard and then failing to apply it. 425 U.S. at 245.
94. 425 U.S. at 245 (citing C.S.C. v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (Hatch Act
restriction on political activities of federal employees)); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601 (1973) (similar restriction on state employees).
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surely even more room for restrictive regulations of state employees
where the claim implicates only the more general contours of the sub-
stantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."
95
The Court then discussed the governing standard of review. It re-
jected the approach taken by the Second Circuit which had required
the department to demonstrate a "genuine public need" for the regula-
tion. 96 Additionally, the Court noted that the function of the judiciary
does not include weighing the conflicting policy arguments presented.9
7
According to the majority, the role of the judiciary when a public em-
ployee complains of interference with matters of personal appearance
is only to inquire whether the regulation bears a rational connection to
a legitimate governmental goal such that the enactment is neither arbi-
trary nor capricious.' 8
This analysis essentially was a formulation of the classic rational-
ity test enumerated in Williamson." If the Court held true to
Williamson, the department would not have been required to articulate
any justification for the regulation, but whether this aspect of the test
was applied in Kelley is not apparent since the trial court, under direc-
tions from the court of appeals, had required the department to offer
substantial justification. 00 The reasons offered at trial were then con-
sidered by the Supreme Court on appeal. It is clear, however, that the
burden was on the patrolman to demonstrate the lack of any conceptual
basis for the restriction, rather than the absence of an actual or practi-
cal connection to a legitimate goal.' 0 ' Under this type of review the
challenged regulation easily passed muster; desirability of uniform ap-
pearance was rationally related to either of the justifications offered by
the department: recognition of the officers among the general public
and instillation of esprit de corps within the police force itself. 102
In his dissent, 0 3 Justice Marshall specifically disagreed with the
finding of a rational connection. He argued that a policeman in uni-
95. 425 U.S. at 245.
96. Id at 247.
97. Id. at 248.
98. Id. at 247-48 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)
(application of the rational-connection test to uphold an Oklahoma statute restricting opti-
cians from fitting and duplicating eyeglasses)). The Court's decision to apply a rationality
test in Kelley, signifies a deference to legislative judgment typically, but not exclusively, re-
stricted to economic and social welfare cases. See generaly B.F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 227-31 (1942). See also notes 62-65 & accompanying text
supra for a discussion of the rationality test in pre-Kelley appearance cases.
99. 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
100. 425 U.S. at 241-42. Specifically, the court of appeals required the department to
show a genuine need for the regulation. Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1973).
101. 425 U.S. at 247.
102. Id. at 248.
103. Id. at 249-56.
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form was not made any more identifiable to the public by virtue of a
short haircut. 04 In rebutting the contention that short hair builds es-
prit de corps, he pointed to the police union's support of the patrol-
man's challenge as an indication that the grooming restriction
contributed to discontent rather than pride and spirit. 105 This approach
suggests a closer examination of the legitimacy of the regulation in ef-
fectuating the departmental organizational needs.10 6 Although Justice
Marshall also described his test in terms of rationality, his course re-
flects the flexible, evidentiary inquiry avoided in the majority opinion.
In essence, he would require a real rather than merely conceptual rela-
tionship. In character with this less restrained treatment, Justice Mar-
shall concluded that because, in his view, the regulation failed to passminimal scrutiny, there was no need to consider the propriety of a
higher standard of review. 07
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell impliedly rejected the
minimal scrutiny approach by advocating a balancing test: 0 8 "When
the state has an interest in regulating one's personal appearance...
there must be a weighing of the degree of infringement of the individ-
ual's liberty interest against the need for the regulation."'' 0 9
Private Citizens Under Kelley
The scope of the Kelley decision was carefully limited to govern-
ment employees alleging infringement of nonfundamental fourteenth
amendment liberty interests." 0 The majority failed to specify the de-
gree of protection that would be afforded a private citizen whose con-
trol over personal appearance is restricted. While the Court only
assumed that such an interest was protected for the purposes of its deci-
sion, language in the majority and concurring opinions seems to sup-
104. Id at 254-55.
105. Id at 255.
106. Although Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that structuring of the police
force and uniform and equipment requirements might rationally relate to the state goal of
an identifiable and well-motivated police force, he felt the same could not be said of the hair
regulation. 425 U.S. at 256.
107. I. at 256 n.8.
108. This is surprising in that Justice Powell claimed to be writing only to emphasize
that the majority opinion should not be construed to disparage recognition of the right to
control appearance. Id at 249.
109. Id Perplexingly enough, Justice Powell's reasoning is similar to that employed by
the Second Circuit and expressly rejected by the majority opinion in Kelley. The circuit
court had required the police department to show the right was outweighed by a legitimate
state interest. Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1973). Kelley expressly rejects
such an approach by stating that courts are not in a position to weigh the policy considera-
tions involved. 425 U.S. at 248.
110. Subsequent cases, however, do not adhere to the limitation. See note 116 & accom-
panying text infra.
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port a greater degree of protection when the plaintiff is a private citizen.
Justice Rehnquist, for instance, was unconvinced that a similar claim of
infringement by a member of the public would be subject to the same
test.I' Justice Powell also noted that application of the regulation
might be an impermissible intrusion upon liberty in another context. 112
Moreover, he made it clear that the decision contained no negative im-
plication with respect to judicial recognition of the right. 1 3
The dissenting Justices in Kelley were less inclined to restrict their
treatment of the issue. Justice Marshall found it beyond question that
the fourteenth amendment protects against comprehensive regulation
of what citizens may or may not wear.' 14 He argued that throughout
history the interest in personal appearance has been a reflection of the
more encompassing individual right to self-governance and personal
choice.' '5 He reasoned that the framers of the constitution had failed
to enumerate a right to control one's appearance only because they
considered it too obvious to need any specification.
Subsequent Treatment
Following Kelley, the question of constitutional safeguards for an
individual's choice in matters of personal appearance remains un-
resolved, at least when state regulation of uniformed civilian forces is
not involved.1 6 Although judicial deference to state and local organi-
111. 425 U.S. at 249.
112. Id
113. Id
114. Id at 250. Marshall added, "It seems to me manifest that that 'full range of con-
duct' which an individual is free to pursue must encompass one's interest in dressing accord-
ing to his own taste. An individual's personal appearance may reflect, sustain, and nourish
his personality and may well be used as a means of expressing his attitude and lifestyle ...
[T]o say that the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not encompass mat-
ters of personal appearance would be fundamentally inconsistent with the values of privacy,
self-identity, and personal integrity that I have always assumed the Constitution was
designed to protect." Id at 250-51 (citations omitted).
115. Id at 253 (citing Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Judge Craven of the
Fourth Circuit has suggested in Personhood The Right to be Let A/one, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699,
699-702, that personal appearance should be included in a new category of judicially recog-
nized, nonfundamental rights "which, considered separately, may seem trivial, but together
make up what most individuals think of as freedom." Id. at 699. Along these same lines,
see Note, The Right of Eccentricity, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 519 (1978).
116. Whatever the intended scope of Kelley, subsequent cases demonstrate a willingness
to apply the rational connection test in a surprisingly wide range of contexts. See, e.g.,
Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (hair
length of privately employed bus driver); Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 199 (N.D.
Cal. 1977) (Navy policy mandating discharge and exclusion from reenlistment of person
engaging in homosexual conduct); Forts v. Malcom, 426 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (city
jail policy prohibiting female pretrial detainees from wearing slacks); Loughran v. Codd,
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zational decisions continues,1 17 the constitutional characterization the
courts will ultimately ascribe to this area of an individual's life is more
elusive. The struggle with this particular definitional uncertainty goes
on whether the status of the complaining individual is that of a public
employee118 or a member of the public in general." 19
Kelley has been uniformly interpreted to mandate some form of
judicial review where appearance rights are restricted. On this basis,
the Seventh Circuit in Pence v. Rosenquist120 overruled its pre-Kelley
decision, Miller v. School District Number 167.121 In Pence, a school
bus driver challenged the validity of a prohibition on beards and mus-
taches. The district court granted summary judgment for the school
officials, relying upon the Miller rule that governmental restrictions
upon employee interests in personal appearance are not subject to re-
view in the federal courts. 22 The court of appeals reversed, holding
that a categorical denial of constitutional relief would be inconsistent
with Kelley and reflected that it would be more appropriate to analyze
the problem in terms of a rational relationship between the rule and a
public purpose. 123 Pence further suggests that the Seventh Circuit will
432 F. Supp. 259, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (police department rule restricting officers on sick
leave to confines of residences); Syrek v. Pennsylvania Air Nat'l Guard, 437 F. Supp. 236,
239 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 537 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1976) (grooming regulation of nonuniformed
civilian technicians); Ahearn v. Digrazia, 412 F. Supp. 638, 639 (D. Mass. 1976) (police
department rule placing officers on punishment duty for unauthorized absence); In re Gatts,
79 Cal. App. 3d 1023, 145 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1978) (grooming regulation of weekend prisoners);
Millsap v. Cedar Rapids Civil Serv. Comm'n, 249 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Iowa 1977) (regulation
suspending police officers for off-duty misconduct).
117. E.g., Syrek v. Pennsylvania Air Nat'l Guard, 437 F. Supp. 236, 239 (W.D. Pa.),
rev'd, 537 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1976); Loughran v. Codd, 432 F. Supp. 259, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 1976);
Gadberry v. Schlesinger, 419 F. Supp. 949, 950 (E.D. Va. 1976); In re Geiger, 337 So. 2d
549, 552 (La. 1976).
118. E.g., Pence v. Rosenquist, 573 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1978) (public school bus drivers);
Marshall v. District of Columbia Gov't, 559 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (police officer);
Youker v. Gulley, 536 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1976) (court reporters).
119. Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976) (nude bathers). This appears to be
the only case aside from Wilson, discussed infra, involving private citizens outside of an
institutional or'employment context.
120. 573 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1978).
121. 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974). See notes 56-59 & accompanying text supra.
122. 573 F.2d at 397, 400.
123. Id at 399. The court explained the basis for its change in position: "The Miller
approach is to hold categorically that a government employee's interest in choosing a style of
appearance is not significant enough to raise a constitutional issue when he is discharged or
excluded from government employment because the employer requires a different style.
The Supreme Court's approach in Kelley does not support Miller. Indeed, but for the lan-
guage about assuming a liberty interest, Kelley conflicts with Miller. At least the Supreme
Court preferred to analyze the relationship of the rule to a governmental purpose than to
adopt a principle categorically excluding the government employee's liberty interest in
choice of personal appearance from constitutional protection." Id
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abandon the fundamental rights classification applied to students in
Breen v. Kahl' 24 in favor of a uniform application of the liberty interest
approach of Kelley.
Although Pence acknowledges that Kelley does provide some lead-
ership in this field, the courts continue to divide over the proper classifi-
cation of the interest in personal appearance. Some of the decisions
outside of disavowing any recognition of the right as fundamental, 
125
are inconclusive as to when, if ever, the right will be upheld against
state intrusion. 126 Other courts are willing to characterize the right as a
fourteenth amendment liberty interest; 127 some only assume such a sta-
tus for decisional purposes. 2 8 Moreover, some of the state courts have
avoided constitutional inquiry entirely by resolving the issue through
statutory construction.
29
The First Circuit Court of Appeals 30 has recognized that the lib-
erty interest of a private citizen may deserve more extensive protection
than that of a public employee or individual in an institutional context.
This view derives support from Kelley,' 3' yet the Supreme Court offers
little guidance as to the appropriate standard of review in such a case.
Perhaps for this reason, the First Circuit in Williams P. Kleppe 32 chose
124. 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969). See notes 49-52 & accompanying text supra.
125. E.g., Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th
Cir. 1976); Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803, 807 (1st Cir. 1976); Hill v. Estelle, 537 F.2d
214, 216 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Gatts, 79 Cal. App. 3d 1023, 1030, 145 Cal. Rptr. 419. 422
(1978).
126. East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), rev'd on re-
hearing en banc, 562 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1977), is a prime example of the confusion and lack of
consensus engendered by this issue. A public school teacher challenged the constitutionality
of a rule requiring him to wear a tie in class. Judge Oakes wrote the majority opinion,
finding that the rule violated first and fourteenth amendment rights. Id at 840-44. In so
doing, he employed an intermediate standard of review akin to a balancing test. Id at 846.
Judge Meskill dissented and argued for a strict Kelley' test. Id at 852-54. He also denied
that first amendment rights were involved. Id. at 847-51. On rehearing en banc the majority
shifted and Judge Meskill wrote the majority opinion, id at 856, while Judge Oakes, dissent-
ing, echoed the sentiments of his now defunct majority opinion. Id at 863-66.
127. Syrek v. Pennsylvania Air Nat'l Guard, 537 F.2d 66, 67 (3d Cir. 1976).
128. Eg. Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803, 807 (1st Cir. 1976).
129. E.g., McClung v. Board of Educ., 46 Ohio 2d 149, 346 N.E.2d 691 (1976) (school-
board action excluding student's picture from yearbook because of long hair enjoined be-
cause it exceeded statutory authority); Independent School Dist. No. 8 v. Swanson, 553 P.2d
496 (Okla. 1976) (school hair-length regulation permanently enjoined because school board
misused rule-making power). See also Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board
Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status.A NonconstitutionalAnalysis, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 373 (1969) (arguing that the validity of school board action is a question of statutory
construction).
130. Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976). See notes 132-37 & accompany-
ing text infra.
131. See notes 110-13 & accompanying text supra.
132. Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803, 807 (1st Cir. 1976).
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to apply in the alternative three standards of review. In Williams, a
private citizen claimed that a total ban on nude bathing along the Cape
Cod seashore infringed upon "one of the smaller liberties entitled to
substantive constitutional protection."'' 33 In response, the court as-
sumed for purposes of the decision that the right deserved "some meas-
ure" of protection and sustained the regulation since it met the
"ordinary, relaxed standard of review, satisfied by a conceived, rational
relationship."134 It arrived at a similar conclusion through the form of
intermediate review contemplated in Richards v. Thurston.' 35 This
holding required a finding that the government interest in preserving
the coastal wilderness outweighed the interest of the plaintiffs in having
a place to nude bathe.' 36 The court indicated it would find an uncon-
stitutional infringement only if the citizen's interests were deemed fun-
damental; however, it expressly rejected such a characterization.
37
The current lack of judicial consensus may stem from the inherent
limitations of the rationality test itself. The framework drawn in Kelley
serves well a court dealing with claims arising purely from state or local
regulation of uniformed organizations. As was shown in Wilson, 138
however, when confronted with a different set of circumstances, the
courts, out of a sense of justice, absence of guiding precedent, or simple
confusion, often stray from a mechanistic search for a rational connec-
tion and apply a significantly different standard of review.
City of Chicago v. Wilson
Kim Kimberly and Wallace Wilson are transsexuals who made the
decision to undergo sex-change operations. In preparation for the op-
erations, they were advised by their psychiatrists to practice living and
dressing as females to test the correctness of their decision. On Febru-
ary 17, 1974 they were arrested on a public street in Chicago while
dressed in women's clothing, wearing wigs and heavy make-up. 139 The
133. Id at 806.
134. Id. ai 807 (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)). See note 62 & accompanying text supra.
135. 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970). See notes 67-69 & accompanying text supra.
136. 539 F.2d at 807.
137. Id
138. See notes 173-83 & accompanying text infra.
139. Both Wilson and Kimberly admitted to the arresting officers that they were biologi-
cally male and explained that they were transsexuals planning to undergo sex-change opera-
tions and were consequently required to practice cross-dressing as part of the usual
preoperative therapy. They were nonetheless arrested and at the station house were re-
quired to pose for pictures in various stages of undress. Both the appellate court and the
supreme court acknowledged the picture taking, but neither commented on its propriety.
City of Chicago v. Wilson, No. 49229, slip. op. at 1 (Ill. May 1978); 44 I11. App. 3d 620, 621,
357 N.E.2d 1337, 1339 (1976).
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city ordinance that they were charged with violating provides in perti-
nent part: "Any person who shall appear in a public place in a dress not
belonging to his or her sex, with intent to conceal his or her sex, shall be
fined. . . .,140 At a joint bench trial Wilson and Kimberly were con-
victed of violating the ordinance and were each fined $100.
From the very outset, Wilson and Kimberly argued that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutional because it unduly infringed upon their free-
dom of expression protected by the first amendment, denied them
equal protection guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments,
and was vague and overbroad in violation of due process. They also
argued that freedom of appearance is a fundamental right protected by
the ninth amendment and the privacy penumbra of the Bill of Rights.
Finally, they urged protection for freedom of appearance under the
fourteenth amendment as a matter of substantive due process. 14 1
The Appellate Court of Illinois rejected these arguments and up-
held the constitutionality of the ordinance.' 42 It disposed of the first
amendment issue by distinguishing pure speech from conduct and held
that the defendants' dress in this case was mere unprotected conduct in
that it was not intended to convey any particular message. 43 The
equal protection issue was based upon the inherent sexual distinction in
the ordinance. 144 The actual effect was to allow a woman to wear a
particular outfit while denying a man the right to wear those same
clothes. Conceding that on its face the ordinance treated men and wo-
men identically, the defendants pointed out that the impact on each sex
would be different and they argued that the use of a sex-based distinc-
tion in this case was arbitrary and beyond the legitimate interests of the
city. The appellate court did little to answer this contention, except to
summarily state that the classification was not arbitrary and to offer the
cryptic and not terribly relevant observation that "the classification
which is the subject of this action is gender itself."'
145
140. CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 192-8 (1964). Ordinances and statutes that may be used to
prohibit cross-dressing are fairly common in the United States although their enforcement is
sporadic. 44 Ill. App. 3d at 623, 357 N.E.2d at 1340. See note 6 & accompanying text supra.
141. In short, the defendants' sought all of the constitutional protections discussed ear-
lier in this Note. See notes 10-37 & accompanying text supra. This "shotgun approach" was
criticized in the city's appellate court brief for indicating uncertainty as to the source of
constitutional protection. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 8. With the law in such a state of
confusion, persons arguing the unconstitutionality of appearance restrictions have little
choice but to raise every possible constitutional protection. See Craven, Personhood" The
Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 708.
142. 44 Ill. App. 3d 620, 357 N.E.2d 1337 (1976).
143. 44 Ill. App. 3d at 624-25, 357 N.E.2d at 1341.
144. In theory the converse is also true, but it might well be argued that the ordinance,
practically speaking, only limits the liberty of males since there are few masculine garments
that women have not appropriated in modem fashion.
145. 44 Ill. App. 3d at 626, 357 N.E.2d at 1342.
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Not restricting itself to a finding that the classification was ration-
ally related to a legitimate governmental objective, the court went one
step further to declare that "the State does have an interest in maintain-
ing the integrity of the sexes." 46 Furthermore, the court foreclosed the
possibility of an equal protection argument based on discrimination
against transsexuals when it said, "[B]ecause the United States
Supreme Court has not recognized any 'liberty' interest in alternative
sexual orientations we may not entertain equal protection arguments
based on any but the two traditional sexual classifications." 147 This ar-
gument is weak at best. An arbitrary classification denies equal protec-
tion regardless of whether there is a recognized liberty interest in being
a member of the group. Otherwise, the legislature might legally dis-
criminate against any group that had no previous sanction of protection
from the United States Supreme Court.
The court also denied that the ordinance was vague or overbroad.
The defendants suggested that unisex fashions make it impossible to
determine what constitutes the clothing of one's own sex, but the court
rejected this argument on the grounds that the specific intent required
in the statute cured any possible vagueness; the wearing of potentially
prohibited unisex fashions would not fall within the ordinance since
the wearer would lack the necessary "intent to conceal his or her
sex."' 48 In making this determination the court distinguished City of
Columbus v. Rogers, 49 an Ohio case in which a similar cross-dressing
ordinance had been struck down on the basis of vagueness. The Ohio
ordinance required no specific intent on the part of the offender and
thus was clearly distinguishable.
The appellate court almost entirely avoided the question of four-
teenth amendment protection of personal appearance as a liberty inter-
est. It cited Kelley only in passing to indicate that the existence of such
protection is still unclear.' 50 Instead, the court skirted the issue of ap-
pearance rights by saying that this ordinance was really not intended to
regulate appearance, but rather to prohibit displays of offensive homo-
sexual conduct. It gave no support for this reading except to say that
"the language of the ordinance suggests" it.' '5 Other than the fact that
section 192-8, the ordinance involved here, is part of the "Public
Morals" Chapter of the Municipal Code, and that it includes a prohibi-
tion of public nudity, it is difficult to understand how the court derived
146. Id
147. Id For a challenge to the traditional two-sex presumption see Dunlap, The Consti-
tutional Rights of Sexual Minorities. A Crisis of the Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 1131 (1979).
148. Id at 625, 357 N.E.2d at 1342.
149. 41 Ohio 2d 161, 324 N.E.2d 563 (1975).
150. 44 11. App. 3d at 623, 357 N.E.2d at 1340. See note 92 & accompanying text supra.
151. 44 Ill. App. 3d at 623, 357 N.E.2d at 1340.
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this reading. 52 Furthermore, the court's typification of cross-dressing
as homosexual conduct demonstrates a basic ignorance about sexual
minorities. Neither transsexuals, such as the defendants in this case,
nor transvestites are properly termed homosexuals and their motiva-
tions and conduct should be analyzed differently in light of the differ-
ent implications for society.- 53 The appellate court decision also
overlooked the fact that regardless of the "intentions" of the City
Council in adopting section 192-8, the effect of the ordinance is still to
regulate dress, and the ordinance should therefore rightfully be ex-
amined as an infringement upon the freedom of appearance.
Concluding that this case, in essence, concerned homosexual con-
duct rather than appearance, the court examined the defendant's ninth
amendment, privacy, and substantive due process arguments in light of
homosexual conduct. Citing Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for
Richmond,154 the court held that homosexual activity is not constitu-
tionally protected as a fundamental right or as a lesser liberty interest.
In Doe, the defendants had challenged the constitutionality of a Vir-
ginia sodomy statute, claiming that it violated their rights to due proc-
ess, privacy, and free expression. A three-judge district court upheld
the statute and the United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed.
From this, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that there was not
even a liberty interest in alternative sexual orientations and that there-
fore the defendants' claim of a fundamental right was unfounded, re-
gardless of the source of the alleged right in the constitution. 
55
Dismissing the privacy issue, the court simply concluded that if an
act (in this case homosexual conduct) may be prohibited in private then
it may likewise be prohibited in public.' 56 Again, the court analyzed
the prohibited act as homosexual conduct rather than as a mere dress-
style choice.
One last argument raised by Wilson and Kimberly concerned their
special situation as transsexuals who planned to undergo sex-change
operations. Both defendants testified that they were under the care of a
152. Id at 622, 357 N.E.2d at 1339.
153. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the
United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 800-05 (1979); Wein & Remmers, Employment Protec-
tion and Gender Dysphoria. Legal Definitions of Unequal Treatment on the Basis of Sex and
Disability, 30 HASTINGS L.J. (1979). Comment, The Law and Transsexualism: A Faltering
Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REV. 288, 292 (1975); Comment, M.T v.
JT: An Enlightened Perspective on Transsexualism, 6 CAP. L. REV. 403 (1977).
154. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1976), affid, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
155. 44 Ill. App. 3d at 623-24, 357 N.E.2d at 1340-41.
156. Id at 624, 357 N.E.2d at 1341. See notes 14-21 & accompanying text supra for an
overview of the privacy right in appearance cases. For a view that advocates that the pri-
vacy right be uniformly expanded to cover appearance issues, see Note, On Privacy:. Consti-
tutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670 (1973).
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psychiatrist who recommended public cross-dressing as a necessary
part of the preoperative therapy. 157 The appellate court refused to con-
sider this, stating that the harmful effects on society of the cross-dress-
ing were the same regardless of the defendants' motives. The court
claimed to have no authority to judicially create an exception to the
ordinance. 158
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois approached the Wilson
case much differently. Most importantly, it viewed the ordinance as a
regulation of personal appearence and analyzed it in that light. It held,
in unqualified terms, that freedom of appearance is indeed protected by
the United States Constitution.159 In so doing, Justice Moran, writing
for the majority, placed primary importance on Kelley, although ac-
knowledging that the assumption of a protectable interest in Kelley was
for decisional purposes only and did not establish a precedent. 60 In
analyzing Kelley, the Illinois court was fully aware of the distinction
between private persons and individuals in an institutional setting, and
apparently agreed that the private citizen's interest is entitled to a
greater degree of protection.'
61
In conjunction with its reliance on Kelley, the court cited a number
of its own prior decisions that clearly limited the power of the state to
regulate personal courses of action having no demonstrable effect on
society at large.' 62 These cases involved a statute requiring the rider of
a motorcycle to wear a helmet, 163 and ordinances prohibiting dancing
in public restaurants, 64 the private possession of liquor, 165 smoking
outdoors in public areas, 166 and the erection and maintenance of bill-
boards in designated areas. 167 In each case the court found no damag-
ing effect on the populace and consequently struck down the statute or
ordinance. The precise purpose of these citations in Wilson is unclear,
but they are important for two reasons. First, they indicate the court's
willingness to inquire into the legitimacy of the statute's purpose. In
157. This is a typical procedure for sex-change candidates. In order to be sure that the
patient has made a correct decision he or she must learn what it will be like to function in
society as a member of the opposite sex. Normally, the cross-dressing period lasts from one
to two years. Comment, M. T v. J. T: An Enlightened Perspective on Transsexualism, 6 CAP.
L. REv. 403, 408 (1977).
158. 44 Ill. App. 3d at 624, 357 N.E.2d at 1341.
159. City of Chicago v. Wilson, No. 49229, slip. op. at 3 (II1. May 1978).
160. Id at 2.
161. Id at 4.
162. Id at 3.
163. People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969).
164. City of Chicago v. Drake Hotel Co., 274 I1l. 408, 113 N.E. 718 (1916).
165. Town of Cortland v. Larson, 273 I11. 602, 113 N.E. 51 (1916).
166. City of Zion v. Behrens, 262 Ill. 510, 104 N.E. 836 (1914).
167. Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 920
(1911).
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terms of a means test, this investigation suggests a principled inquiry
into the end as well as means components. Second, this line of cases
suggests that the Illinois court will restrict legislative curtailments of
personal freedoms to situations that result in actual harm to society.
Relying on these cases in conjunction with Kelley, the court easily
found that the Constitution "provides an individual some measure of
protection with regard to his choice of appearance."165 Neither the de-
gree of protection to be afforded, nor the constitutional source of the
right was specified, but it is clear that the right was not deemed
fundamental. 1
69
Having established the existence of a protectable interest, the court
concentrated on determining when the state may infringe that interest.
It acknowledged that Kelley offers no guidance on this point, since it
concerned a uniformed public employee rather than the private citizens
involved here. The court set up its own standard, which is quite differ-
ent from the rationality test applied in Kelley.' 70 Two elements were
considered in ruling on the permissibility of the infringement on ap-
pearance rights: the circumstances of the case and the reasons given by
the city to justify the ordinance. The term "circumstances" was not
defined, but was applied very broadly to include the particular factual
situation of these defendants in their status as preoperative transsexuals
advised to cross-dress as part of their psychiatric therapy. This analysis
directly opposed the appellate court determination that the individual
defendants' circumstances were irrelevant.'
7'
In its brief the city listed four objectives of the ordinance, which
the court summarized as follows: "1) to protect citizens from being mis-
led or defrauded; 2) to aid in the description and detection of criminals;
3) to prevent crimes in washrooms; and 4) to prevent inherently antiso-
cial conduct .... ,,172 Although the city asserted these purposes, it of-
fered no data to substantiate its conclusion that cross-dressing is related
to criminal activity and has deleterious effects on society's morals.
Under the Williams rationality test the city would not have been re-
quired to state its purposes, much less to prove the connection between
the statute and goal, but, as will be shown, the city's lack of evidence
168. City of Chicago v. Wilson, No. 49229, slip. op. at 3 (Ill. May 1978).
169. Id at 4.
170. Id at 4-5. If the Kelley-type rationality test had been applied, the city almost cer-
tainly would have prevailed. In both cases there was a paucity of evidence supporting the
regulation's effect and some evidence expressly indicating that it failed to achieve its pur-
ported goals. Nonetheless, the police department prevailed in Keller because the court was
unwilling to inquire whether there was a "practical" connection. See notes 99-107 & accom-
panying text supra.
171. See notes 151-53 & accompanying text supra.
172. Slip. op. at 4.
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was crucial in this court's determination.1 73
The standard used by the Illinois Supreme Court in evaluating the
circumstances of the case and the city's reasons for the ordinance is
very difficult to identify precisely. Nowhere does the court label or ex-
plain the test that it applied, but the process of analysis used indicates
that either a means test or a balancing test was employed; the decision
is equally susceptible to either interpretation.174
A means test, commonly applied in equal protection cases, places
primary emphasis on the efficacy of a statute in executing its purported
goals.175 In short, it focuses on the means used to achieve an admit-
tedly legitimate end. There is no question that a city has the power to
enact ordinances protecting its citizens from "washroom crimes," help-
ing to detect criminals, and safeguarding the morals of the commu-
nity. 176 Although these goals are normally legitimate and recognized
concerns of government, the Illinois Supreme Court questioned the
efficacy of section 192-8 in achieving these goals. 177 As previously indi-
cated, the city failed to demonstrate any connection between cross-
dressing and criminal behavior, and the court refused to assume the
existence of such a connection. In addition, the fact that Wilson and
Kimberly were not engaged in otherwise criminal activity and had a
positive reason for cross-dressing further weakened the city's position.
In summary, four factors indicated that the ordinance did not act as a
"means" which achieved a legitimate goal: 1) the lack of evidence by
the city; 2) the lack of any self-evident connection between criminality
and cross-dressing; 3) the fact that these defendants were not engaging
in otherwise criminal activity; and 4) the positive reason given by the
defendants for their cross-dressing.
The same process was used to evaluate the city's final justification,
the prevention of inherently antisocial conduct. The city's brief is de-
void of any evidence showing the effect of cross-dressing on the morals
of the citizenry.' 78 The court was willing to assume that witnessing
cross-dressing might offend the aesthetic sensibilities of a passerby, but
173. See notes 62-63, 98-106 & accompanying text supra.
174. There is language in the decision to support both interpretations. The words
"weighing" and "balance" appear in the decision, but the court also stressed the city's bur-
den of showing how the purported harm to society results.
175. See generaly Gunther, Forword In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court A Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) (suggesting that an
intensified means scrutiny, under the auspices of equal protection, will provide the courts
new flexibility in deciding a wide variety of personal liberty cases).
176. These goals fall within the traditional role of the state to protect the health, safety,
welfare, and morals of its citizens.
177. City of Chicago v. Wilson, No. 49229, slip. op. at 4-5 (I1. May 1978).
178. The brief contains but one sentence concerning morals. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee
at 19.
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it refused to assume any more serious effect on morals. 179 Because of
this failure to demonstrate causality, and since purely aesthetic sensibil-
ities are not in and of themselves usually protectable at the expense of
another's liberty, the court concluded that the public would have to
suffer some minor discomfort so that the defendants could pursue their
recommended therapy. 80 Viewed in terms of a means test, the court
was actually saying that the ordinance had not been shown to protect
public morals in any meaningful way.' 8'
Perhaps an even more convincing method of analyzing the court's
reasoning is in terms of a balancing test in which the interests of the
two parties are weighed.' 82 Many of the same factors are involved in a
balancing test as in a means test, but they appear in a different analyti-
cal framework. Essentially, the importance of the government's pur-
pose and the efficacy of the statute in achieving it are balanced against
the importance of the liberty interest involved and the severity of the
infringement. When this analysis is applied to reasons one through
three above, the city's mere assertion that persons do in fact cross-dress
for the purposes of committing crimes and/or escaping detection is
weighed against the defendants' need to cross-dress and the fact that if
the ordinance is upheld against them they will be deprived of the ther-
apy that medical experts consider crucial. When the balance was
struck, the defendants prevailed. The issue was more complicated with
respect to reason number four since the court was at least willing to
assume that cross-dressing would offend the general public. The need
to protect its citizenry from "offensive" displays of atypical sexuality
constituted the whole of the city's interest, in the court's view. This
interest was balanced against the need for an efficacious therapy pro-
gram. Weighing the interests, the court concluded that the defendants
prevailed. The significance of framing the defendants' interest in terms
of their particular circumstances rather than in the abstract becomes
immediately apparent.
Lest this distinction between a means test and a weighing standard
179. The appellate court had been willing to assume that cross-dressing "'is likely to end
in a contribution to moral delinquency."' 44 Il1. App. 3d 620, 623, 357 N.E.2d 1337, 1341
(1976).
180. City of Chicago v. Wilson, No. 49229, slip. op. at 5 (Il1. May 1978).
181. The court cites Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436,
94 N.E. 920 (1911), which says, in discussing dress and other personal choices: "[i1t has
never been thought that the legislature could invade private rights so far as to prescribe the
course to be pursued in these and other like matters, although the highly cultured may find
on every street in every town and city many things that are not only open to criticism but
shocking to the aesthetic tastes." Id at 443, 94 N.E. at 923.
182. For a discussion of pre-Kelley cases using a weighing test, see notes 67-69 & accom-
panying text supra. Judge Craven of the Fifth Circuit proposes a balancing test, as do a
number of other legal scholars. Craven, Personhood The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 699; Kelley v. Johnson and Tonsorial Tastes, supra note 10.
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seem unimportant,18 3 it is essential to consider Wilson as a source of
precedent. Since the court's decision leaves the statute in force, it is
possible that another case might arise involving a transvestite defend-
ant not under a psychiatrist's care. This change in the factual situation
would be more likely to alter the outcome under a weighing test than
under a means test since the former test tends to give more considera-
tion to context and particular circumstances. In a weighing test, the
defendant's sole interest might be reduced to a desire to dress as he or
she chooses. When balanced against the city's interest in sheltering its
citizens from displays that they find offensive, the result might be very
different and, at the very least, the precedential value of Wilson in de-
ciding the case would be weakened. On the other hand, if Wilson is
read as applying a means test, then a change in the particular defend-
ant's situation should not, theoretically, be as crucial since the ordi-
nance is still no more or less effective as a means of achieving the
desired ends.
Conclusion
As the first significant case since Kelley v. Johnson in which the
constitutional interest of a private citizen in controlling his or her ap-
pearance is burdened by state regulation, the Wilson decision stands as
an important attempt to fill the analytical void left by the Supreme
Court. In assessing the significance of the case, it is immediately appar-
ent that the court was sensitive not only to the importance of dress
choices, but to another interest of the defendants' as well.
First, the court explicitly afforded "some measure" of constitu-
tional protection for choices in personal appearance. 84 In so doing, it
chose not to identify the specific source of the right; instead, it reasoned
that to permit the state to proscribe certain modes of appearance as if
no such right existed would be fundamentally inconsistent with a rec-
ognized panoply of individual rights, including " 'privacy, self-identity,
autonomy, and personal integrity.' "185 Second, although the court did
not specifically acknowledge a liberty interest in alternative sexual ori-
entations, it was cognizant of the defendants' need for unhindered psy-
chological adaptation to their new sexual identities. This concern
figured heavily in the court's final disposition of the case, as evidenced
by its unwillingness to assume any state interest beyond enforcement of
societal aesthetic preferences and its underscoring of the defendants'
interest in maintaining an efficacious preoperative therapy program.
183. Far from being unimportant, the search for a flexible, workable middle standard of
review has been the occasion for voluminous legal writing. For examples of these works see
note 186 infra.
184. City of Chicago v. Wilson, No. 49229, slip. op. at 3 (II. May 1978).
185. Id (quoting Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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The court acknowledged that a different result would have frustrated
the state policy providing for the issuance of new birth certificates after
sex-change operations, but it is difficult to ascertain how heavily this
consideration weighed in the court's analysis. This general sensitivity
to the need for sexual adjustment may lay the foundation for a formal
recognition, sometime in the future, of a liberty interest in the more
general pursuit of alternative sexual identities.
Further significance lies in Wilson's striking departure from the
minimal scrutiny standard announced in Kelley. While Justice Moran
cited Kelley for its proposition that the degree of judicial review is de-
pendent upon the context in which the right is asserted, he noted that
the rational connection test was inapplicable when the regulation oper-
ates only upon citizens at large as opposed to persons in state organiza-
tional or institutional settings; thus, he opted for a more flexible
standard of review. The chosen course reflects a thoughtful factual in-
quiry, rather than total deference to state action. This is demonstrated
both by the court's emphasis on the defendants' unique interests in
cross-dressing and its requirement that the city prove some real harm to
society before restricting the defendants' activity. Certainly the need
for a middle standard of review similar to that adopted here has been
recognized by many authorities; 186 however, this is the first appearance
case concerning private citizens to be clearly decided under such an
intermediate test. 1
87
The difficulty with Wilson, however, is that while it clearly demon-
186. Early recognition of the need for a middle level of review is found in McCloskey.
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court. An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT.
REv. 34, 40-41. The most extensive treatment appears in Gunther, Foreword- In Search of
Ei'ol'ing Doctrine on a Changing Court A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1972). Based upon his observations in equal protection cases, Professor Gunther
foresaw an intensified means scrutiny requiring legislative means to substantially further
legislative ends. He described the approach as follows: "It would have the court assess the
means in terms of legislative purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in
conjecture. Moreover, it would have the Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable
means on the basis of materials that are offered to the Court, rather than resorting to ratio-
nalizations created by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing." Id at 21; accord, Note, On Pri-
vac: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 670, 704-05 (1973)
(proposing a "means scrutiny" to determine whether means chosen by the state are in fact
reasonably or rationally related to a legitimate state end).
Judge Craven also felt an intermediate standard was desirable, but he advocated a bal-
ancing test wherein the individual's interest is weighed against the state's asserted interest
and the rationality of the means employed. The burden would be on the state to show
factually that its interests were strong enough to justify the infringement. Craven, Per-
sonhood The Right to be Let .41one, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 719-20.
187. Williams v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976), at least hypothetically applied a
balancing test; however, it is unclear whether the holding was actually based on an interme-
diate standard of review since the court also relied on a rationality test. See notes 102-07 &
accompanying text supra.
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strates a move away from minimal scrutiny where the private citizen is
involved, it fails to fully articulate its chosen standard of review. State-
ments evidencing either a means scrutiny or a weighing test provide
insufficient guidance for future courts. Because of the court's emphasis
upon the unique interests of the defendants and its failure to fully ex-
plain its analysis, applications of the Wilson approach may be limited
by the particular facts of the case. Indeed, there is a clear implication
that the city may be able to justify enforcement of the regulation in a
different fact situation with a stronger evidentiary showing.188 Thus, it
is unresolved whether other persons who engage in cross-dressing, such
as transvestites or "drag queens," who are arrested under similar stat-
utes may confidently cite Wilson as a source of protection.
It is apparent that the search for a standard of review will continue
where the nonfundamental right of appearance is asserted in the face of
statutory regulation. Until the Supreme Court speaks on the issue, or
until the lower courts refine and develop the Wilson standard, the mat-
ter will not be resolved. Nevertheless, Wilson is significant evidence of
the constitutional protection the right will be afforded. The Illinois
Supreme Court avoided dichotomizing sexual conduct and dress
choices and adopted an approach considering both the appearance and
sexual identity aspects of the case to the extent that they overlapped in
the particular facts at issue. Its decision was based on the realization
that the issue embraces more than an individual's interest in making
unfettered decisions in personal appearance. A mode of dress is a man-
ifestation of personality, and therefore such regulations encroach upon
individual efforts to fully develop and express self-identity. In this
sense at least, Wilson recognizes the necessity of a more thoughtful con-
sideration of individual interests where a state desires to burden the
nonfundamental constitutional rights of its private citizens.
188. The holding in Wilson seems to support this implication. The court refused to in-
validate the ordinance on its face which, in effect, gives the city a second chance to make its
case should the law be challenged in the future. City of Chicago v. Wilson, No. 49229, slip.
op. at 5 (Il. May 1978).
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